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Since  its  post-Lisbon  increase  in  (legislative  and  non-legislative) 
powers, the European Parliament (EP) is more relevant than ever in 
the geographically diversified multilevel system of the EU. Party group 
coordinators occupy a crucial position in collective decision-making 
within the EP. However, knowledge about these pivotal actors is absent. 
This raises the question as to who these party group coordinators are, 
what they do, and what indeed makes a good coordinator. A new 
data set shows that in 2012, more than one-fifth of coordinators of 
the three largest and most influential groups are German, with British 
and Spanish coordinators ranking a distant second before Romanians. 
Among coordinators from NMS, only one-eighth were newcomers.
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Introduction
Who  establishes  the  speakers’  lists  for  plenary  sessions  in 
Strasbourg and decides that Claude Turmes, a Green Member of 
the European Parliament (MEP) from Luxembourg, becomes the 
rapporteur for the controversial Energy-efficiency Directive; or 
that Angelika Niebler, a German centre-right MEP who chaired 
the  Parliament’s  Industry,  Research  and  Energy  committee 
(ITRE) between 2007 and 2009, is appointed rapporteur for 
the Mobile-phone roaming charges Directive; and that David 
Martin, a senior British MEP from the Socialists & Democrats 
group (S&D), is put in charge of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA)? Who acts as so-called ‘whips’ maximising 
voting  cohesion  among  party  groups’  contingents  in 
committee  and  full  plenary  meetings?  Who  prepares  the 
organisation  of  the  hearings  of  Commissioners-designate 
in  parliamentary  committees  and  decides  whether  the 
Commissioners-designate are qualified both to 
be members of the Commission’s College and 
to carry out the particular duties they have been 
assigned?
These decisions are taken by a small group of 
highly influential MEPs; so-called party group 
coordinators. These individuals, such as Jean-
Paul Gauzès, a French European People’s Party 
(EPP) member on the Economic and Monetary 
Affairs committee (ECON)  with a firm grip on 
the  complicated  and  fast-changing  world 
of  finance  and  Ingeborg  Grässle,  a  German 
centre-right  MEP  on  the  Budgetary  Control 
committee (CONT), occupy a crucial position 
in collective decision-making in the European 
Parliament (EP). Political coordinators are the 
nexus  mediating  between  individual  MEPs, 
national party delegations that citizens voted 
for,  and  the  European  party  group. They  are 
members chosen to represent their groups at 
preparatory discussions on policy guidelines, 
on the strategy pursued by the parliamentary 
committee  and  on  organising  the  practical 
side of the committee’s work. They convene short meetings in 
closed session, where they assign rapporteurships to groups 
and each of them compiles voting instructions along which 
MEPs of their group vote very cohesively. 
However, knowledge about these pivotal actors is absent. This 
raises the question as to who these coordinators are, what their 
role is, and what makes a good coordinator. This article seeks 
to answer these questions. It is structured as follows: first, we 
outline the various important tasks carried out by party group 
coordinators in the EP. Drawing on a novel dataset comprising 
information  on  EP6  (2004-2009)  and  EP7  (2009-2012),  we 
formulate a number of lessons regarding the distribution of party 
group coordinator posts. Eventually, we conclude by providing   
a first analysis of the qualities coordinators should have. 
What is the role of political party group coordinators in the 
European Parliament?
Most  of  the  parliamentary  work  is  carried  out  in  the  EP’s 
committee  structure.  There  are  20  standing  parliamentary 
committees, two sub-committees (on human rights; security 
and  defence)  and  one  special  committee  (on  organised 
crime,  corruption  and  money  laundering).  Within  every 
parliamentary  committee  a  significant  part  is  played  by 
party  group  coordinators.  Only  recently  recognised  in  the 
EP’s rules of procedure (Rule 192), party group coordinators 
considerably influence the work of the EP’s committee system, 
while often rivalling the committee’s bureau (chair and vice-
chair persons). In particular ‘the balance of power between 
chairs and party group coordinators appears to vary in terms 
of personality and size of the groups from which the holders   
of these offices are drawn’ (Whitaker, 2011, 91; 2001). 
Despite the importance of party group coordinators for the EP’s 
day-to-day decision-making, much is not known about these 
influential individuals. Elected by each party group’s members 
on every committee at the start of each legislative term and 
mid-term,  in  line  with  other  committee  and 
EP  leadership  positions,  their  powers  cover 
a  considerable  range  of  activities.  They  can 
mainly be divided along three categories:
In each committee they act as the party group’s 
spokesperson  in  the  subject  area  concerned, 
debate the committee’s future agenda, allocate 
reports  to  one  of  the  party  groups,  discuss 
forthcoming  plenary  votes  and  possible 
compromise  amendments,  establish  the 
speakers’ lists for plenary sessions, prepare the organisation 
of  the  hearings  of  Commissioners-designate,  and  decide 
whether the Commissioners-designate are qualified. 
Among the members of their party groups, they play a key 
role in formulating the party group’s policy, allocate (shadow) 
rapporteurships  for  legislative  and  non-legislative  acts, 
and  convene  preparatory  meetings  before  the  start  of  the 
committee meeting.
Political  coordinators  are  the  nexus 
mediating  between  individual  MEPs, 
national party delegations that citizens 
voted for, and the European party group.
Rule 192: Committee coordinators [. . .]
1. The political groups may designate one of their members as coordinator.
2. The  committee  coordinators  shall  if  necessary  be  convened  by  their   
  committee Chair to prepare decisions to be taken by the committee, in   
  particular  decisions  on  procedure  and  the  appointment  of  rapporteurs.   
  The committee may delegate the power to take certain decisions to the   
  coordinators,  with  the  exception  of  decisions  concerning  the  adoption   
  of reports, opinions or amendments. The Vice-Chairs may be invited to   
  participate in the meetings of committee coordinators in a consultative   
  role. The coordinators shall endeavour to find a consensus. When consensus   
  cannot be reached, they may act only by a majority that clearly represents a   
  large majority of the committee, having regard to the respective strengths   
  of the various groups.
3. The committee coordinators shall be convened by their committee Chair   
  to prepare the organisation of the hearings of Commissioners-designate.   
  Following  those  hearings,  the  coordinators  shall  meet  to  evaluate  the   
  nominees in accordance with the procedure laid down in Annex XVII.
  [. . .]
Source: Rules of procedure of the European Parliament (April 2012)15
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At the full plenary they maximise their party group’s presence 
during key votes in committee and the full plenary, and ensure 
voting  cohesion  among  their  party  group’s  contingent  in 
committee and full plenary meetings.
The distribution of party group coordinators in the European 
Parliament 
In  order  to  shed  light  on  who  the  coordinators  are,  we 
compiled a novel data set covering the four largest political 
groups – EPP, S&D, ALDE (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 
for Europe), and Greens/EFA (European Free Alliance) – across 
all standing committees and their subcommittees for the sixth 
and seventh legislative terms, that is from 2004 until 2012.   
It  comprises  almost  250  MEPs  who  served  as  coordinators 
for at least part of the last eight years. We thus obtain unique 
insights into the MEPs effectively ‘running the show’. Here, we 
focus on the nationality of some of these coordinators.
Analysing the Nationality of Coordinatorships
The  nationality  of  MEPs  holding  leadership  positions  is 
relevant as national interest might influence MEPs’ preferences.   
On the ECON committee dealing with issues such as financial 
regulation, for instance, a French MEP might 
have different views than a British MEP seeking 
to  protect  the  City.  In  addition,  within  party 
groups,  nationality  represents  a  proxy  for 
different  constituent  national  party  groups, 
to  which  committee  work  is  of  increasing 
importance following the increase in powers 
of the EP (Whitaker, 2011). In order to agree on 
a party line within a political group, conflicts 
between different national party delegations, 
such  as  British  Labour,  German  Social 
Democrats or the French Socialist Party, needs 
to  be  settled.  Coordinators  hold  a  party  group  role  which 
requires  independence,  acting  as  brokers  seeking  to  avoid 
divisions. It is hence reasonable to expect that they have some 
room for manoeuvre so as to influence the party group line. 
Research has established that MEPs vote very cohesively along 
that line once it has been set (Hix et al., 2007).
In 2012, more than one-fifth of coordinators of the three largest 
and most influential groups are German, with British and Spanish 
coordinators  ranking  a  distant  second  before  Romanians.   
The strong presence of German MEPs in these positions can 
partly  be  explained  by  the  strength  of  their  national  party 
delegations within the three groups (see Figure 1a-c). 
Other national delegations, such as from the UK or Poland, 
have larger contingents in less influential fringe groups such 
as the ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists), which we 
do not focus on here (but see Figure 1). In addition, previous 
research  has  highlighted  that  many  German  MEPs  commit 
to long-term work in the EP rather than short stints before 
returning to positions in their home countries (Scarrow, 1997). 
The lower turnover is thus arguably reflected in the share of 
coordinator positions, with which MEPs can be rewarded for 
building up long-term experience and expertise. 
New Member States versus old EU 15 Member States
When considering the experience of MEPs as an explanatory 
factor in the election of coordinators, the presence of new 
Member  States  (NMS)  as  opposed  to  the  old  EU15  in+ 
these posts is interesting. Kaeding & Hurka (2010) find that 
MEPs from NMS are underrepresented in the allocation of 
rapporteurships, which implies that the group of rapporteurs 
is clearly no microcosm of the full plenary. The allocation of 
reports appears to be a self-selection process where MEPs 
seek  reports  that  reflect  their  particular  interests.  This  is 
astonishing  if  we  acknowledge  the  growing  importance 
of  informal  trilogues,  in  which  rapporteurs  are  the  key 
parliamentary negotiators with essential legislative and non-
legislative  powers. This  time,  we  therefore  ask  how  MEPs 
from NMS are represented amongst the coordinators that 
allocate rapporteurships. 
The data show that the 2004 and 2007 enlargements were 
not yet fully reflected among coordinators during EP6. This 
holds for all three party groups during the sixth legislative 
term when their countries joined the EU; this is also in line 
with expectations, since this was the first term for these MEPs, 
with those from Romania and Bulgaria only joining after mid-
term. The picture changes dramatically in the current term, 
when many of the Members had already gained parliamentary 
experience. 
However,  the  representation  of  MEPs  from  NMS  among 
coordinators differs vastly among groups. The EPP, in which 
representatives  from  new  Member  States  make  up  a  third 
of  the  faction,  has  seen  a  steep  increase  in  coordinators 
from  NMS,  up  by  38  percentage  points  to  44  per  cent.   
For ALDE, while the share of MEPs from NMS decreased by   
10 percentage points, the share of coordinators defied the 
Figure 1a-c
EP 6: 
MEPs
EP 6: 
Coordinators
EP7: 
MEPs
EP7: 
Coordinators
NMS Old MS NMS Old MS NMS Old MS NMS Old MS
EPP 31% 69% 6%  94%  33% 67% 44%  56% 
S&D 22% 78% 3%  97%  27% 73% 7%  93% 
ALDE 32% 68% 3%  97%  22% 78% 25%  75% 
Plenary 28% 72% 27% 73%
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trend  and  increased  by  22  points.  Remarkably,  MEPs  from 
NMS  are  thus  better  represented  in  EPP  and  ALDE  among 
coordinators than in their faction at large. For S&D, in contrast, 
the  share  of  MEPs  from  NMS  is  still  very  low  in  EP7.  This 
suggests that more MEPs clung on to their positions.
Experience of coordinators
When  we  consider  the  experience  of  the  coordinators  as 
a factor influencing their election as coordinators, it is first 
notable that almost one-third of the coordinators of the three 
groups were newcomers to the Parliament at the outset of the 
7th legislative term. Among coordinators from NMS, only one-
eighth were newcomers, pointing to a group of MEPs from 
these countries who came to stay, even though the EP is often 
only considered a transit station qualifying them for national-
level positions. 
This  is  a  particularly  interesting  result,  especially  when 
compared with the findings of Kaeding & Hurka (2010) on 
the  rapporteurship  selection  in  the  EP. They  showed  that 
the chances of becoming rapporteur in the sixth term were 
significantly  lower  for  MEPs  from  the  accession  countries 
than  for  MEPs  from  the  long-standing  Member  States. 
Curiously, this even remained true when they held seniority 
to  be  constant  and  considered  only  MEPs 
who had served for exactly the same time 
period.  First-timers  from  the ‘old’  Member 
States were clearly at an advantage in the 
report  allocation  process  in  comparison 
with  their  colleagues  from  the  accession 
countries. This bias towards nationality does 
seem to hold for coordinators.
Once  elected  and  doing  a  good  job, 
coordinators and their colleagues might not wish to change 
successful arrangements.  A party’s successful management 
of  a  policy  area  stands  and  falls  with  the  coordinator,  so 
members of the committee have a strong incentive to select 
the person they deem most fit for the job.
More generally speaking, the election of coordinators (for the 
biggest party groups) does seem to be influenced by party 
groups, which control leadership positions, or national party 
delegations,  which  ascribe  different  levels  of  importance 
to expertise in the European Parliament. So what makes a 
good coordinator in the eyes of committee members and 
their party group? The answer is, the task of coordinators is 
challenging and requires a certain set of skills.
Conclusions
Coordinators are usually very committed MEPs, characterised 
by expertise, interpersonal and negotiating skills, paired with 
credibility to represent the party group line. Particularly in large 
groups, the post is often hotly contested and MEPs canvass and 
enmesh their colleagues in series of personal meetings. While 
there are some horizontal skills that coordinators require across 
the board, there are some differences across party groups.
Coordinators  face  different  challenges  when  comparing 
small and large groups. While for the Greens/EFA, there are 
currently  two  members  sitting  on  the  International  Trade 
committee, there are eleven from the EPP group representing 
eight national delegations. In order to find a common party 
position,  coordinators  for  large  groups  need  to  mediate 
between individual MEPs and various national 
party  delegations.  Those  for  smaller  groups 
will often need to find compromises without 
immediate  feedback  from  colleagues,  and 
thus  need  excellent  knowledge  of  their 
colleagues’ preferences in order for their group 
to support the deals and to protect their very 
own credibility. While coordinators form large 
groups will thus spend much of their time in 
meetings with MEPs from their own group, they 
can rely on colleagues’ support for (shadow-) 
rapporteurships. Their counterparts in smaller 
groups, in contrast, often need to engage in 
these themselves, and thus take part in many 
informal  trilogues  with  the  Commission  and 
Council  to  draft  amendments  and  negotiate 
with them.
Regardless of the party group, thorough expertise in the policy 
area is indispensable in order to credibly negotiate on these 
matters. Knowing the ins and outs of parliamentary work, i.e. 
EP experience, is likewise crucial. And here nationality does 
not seem to matter; first-timers from the ‘old’ Member States 
were at an advantage in the selection process when compared 
with their first-timer colleagues from the NMS. 
When  executing  these  responsibilities,  personal  networks 
matter, and national party delegations are key components of 
these. Pulling the strings from behind the scenes, coordinators 
are  thus  key  players  in  the  Parliament,  and  a  better 
understanding of their role will help us to better understand 
EU policy-making.
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Among  coordinators  from  NMS,  only 
one-eighth  were  newcomers,  pointing 
to a group of MEPs from these countries 
who  came  to  stay,  even  though  the 
EP  is  often  only  considered  a  transit 
station qualifying them for national-level 
positions.
Regardless of the party group, thorough 
expertise in the policy area is indispen-
sable in order to credibly negotiate on 
these matters. 17
Committee EPP S&D ALDE Greens ECR GUE/NGL
AFET Foreign Affairs Salafranca (ES) Gomes (PT) Neyts-
Uyttebroeck 
(BE)
Lunacek (AT) and 
Brantner (DE)
Tannock (UK) Meyer (ES)
AFCO Constitutional 
Affairs 
Trzaskowski 
(PL)
Gualtieri (IT) Duff (UK) Häfner (DE) Fox (UK) Sondergaard 
(DK)
AGRI Agriculture and 
Rural Development 
Dess (DE) Capoulas 
Santos (PT)
Lyon (UK) Häusling (DE) Nicholson (UK) Rubiks (LV)
BUDG Budgets  Garriga Polledo 
(ES)
Färm (SE) Haglund (FI) Trüpel (DE) Ashcroft (UK) Portas (PT)
CONT Budgetary Control  Gräßle (DE) Geier (DE) Mulder (NL) Staes (BE) Czarnecki (PL) Sondergaard 
(DK)
CULT Culture and 
Education 
Scurria(IT) Kammerevert 
(DE)
Takkula (FI) Benarab- Attou 
(FR)
Migalski (PL) Vergiat (FR)
DEVE Development  Kaczmarek (PL) 
and Mitchell (IE)
Cortés Lastra 
(ES)
Goerens (LU) Grèze (FR) Deva (UK) Le Hyaric (FR)
ECON Economic and 
Monetary Affairs 
Gauzès (FR) Ferreira (PT) Goulard (FR) 
and Schmidt 
(SE, deputy)
Giegold (DE) Swinburne 
(UK)
Klute (DE)
EMPL Employment and 
Social Affairs 
Őry (HU) Cercas (ES) Hirsch (DE) 
and Harkin 
(IE, deputy)
Lambert (UK) Cabrnoch (CZ) Händel (DE)
ENVI Environment, Public 
Health and Food 
Safety 
Liese (DE) and 
Seeber (AT)
McAvan (UK) Davies (UK) Hassi (FI) Rosbach (DK) Liotard (NL)
IMCO Internal Market 
and Consumer 
Protection 
Schwab (DE) Gebhardt (DE) Manders (NL) 
and 
Chatzimarkakis 
(DE, deputy)
Rühle (DE) Bielan (PL) De Jong (NL)
INTA International Trade Caspary (DE) Lange (DE) Kazak (BG) Jadot (FR) Sturdy (UK) Scholz (DE)
ITRE Industry, Research , 
Energy 
Del Castillo 
Vera (ES)
Riera Madurell 
(ES)
Rohde (DK) Turmes (LU) Chichester 
(UK)
Matias (PT)
JURI Legal Affairs  Zwiefka (PL) Berlinguer (IT) Wikström (SE) Lichten-berger 
(AT)
Karim (UK) Mastalka (CZ)
LIBE Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home 
Affairs
Busuttil (MT) Moraes (UK) Weber (RO) Sargentini (NL) Kirkhope (UK) Triantaphyllides 
(CY)
PECH Fisheries  Antinoro (IT) Rodust (DE) Gallagher (IE) Lövin (SE) Grobarczyk 
(PL)
Ferreira (PT)
PETI Petitions  Jahr (DE) Bostinari (RO) Valean (RO) Auken (DK) Chichester 
(UK)
Chountis (EL)
REGI Regional 
Development 
Van Nistelrooij 
(NL)
Krehl (DE) Manescu (RO) Alfonsi (FR) Vlasak (CZ) Omarjee (FR)
TRAN Transport and 
Tourism
Grosch (BE) El Khadraoui 
(BE)
Meissner (DE) Cramer (DE) and 
Lichtenberger (AT)
Zile (LV) Kohlicek (CZ)
FEMM Women’s Rights and 
Gender Equality 
Nedelcheva 
(BG)
Thomsen (DK) Parvanova (BG) Cornelissen (NL) Yannakoudakis 
(ECR)
Zuber (PT)
DROI Human Rights  Tőkés (RO) and 
Vaidere (LV)
Howitt (UK) Donskis (LT) Tavares (PT) Tannock (UK) Vergiat (FR)
SEDE Security and Defence Gahler (DE) Koppa (EL) Van Baalen (NL) Cronerg(FI) Van Orden (UK) Lösing (DE)
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Figure 3: European Parliament party group coordinators (2012)*
*  Unfortunately, we were not able to retrieve the respective information for the EFD.18
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